Apple removes AdGuard’s TrustTunnel iOS app from Russian App Store

Apple has removed AdGuard’s TrustTunnel VPN client for iOS from Russia’s App Store following a request by the country’s internet regulator.

Apple notified AdGuard via email of the app’s removal due to alleged violations of Russian law. According to the notice, the app “includes content that is illegal in Russia,” citing Apple’s App Review Guidelines that require developers to comply with local regulations in all distribution regions. The takedown request references Article 15.1 of Russia’s law “On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection,” which empowers authorities to restrict access to content and services deemed prohibited.

TrustTunnel is an open-source VPN protocol released in January 2026, accompanied by a lightweight client application designed to connect users to custom-configured servers. While the iOS client has been delisted from Russia’s App Store, Apple confirmed that the app remains available in other regions. The Android version also continues to be distributed via Google Play, leaving that platform unaffected for now.

The removal aligns with a broader enforcement campaign led by Roskomnadzor, Russia’s federal communications watchdog, which has increasingly targeted tools that enable users to bypass state-imposed internet restrictions. In July 2024, Apple removed dozens of VPN applications from the Russian App Store, including AdGuard VPN.

Since then, regulatory pressure has intensified. A 2024 law effectively criminalized the dissemination of information about bypassing online censorship, expanding the legal basis for enforcement. By March 2026, authorities shifted focus from mainstream VPN services to more flexible technologies, including customizable VPN clients and proxy tools that allow users to configure private connections. The removal of TrustTunnel appears to reflect this broadened scope, signaling that even neutral, infrastructure-level tools are now subject to scrutiny.

TrustTunnel’s developers argue that the app itself does not provide inherent circumvention capabilities. Instead, it functions as a generic client that requires users to connect to independently configured servers. In this sense, they describe it as a neutral networking tool with legitimate applications in corporate environments, private communications, and internal infrastructure. They contend that targeting such software is analogous to restricting web browsers based on potential misuse, rather than actual functionality.

For existing users in Russia, the app will continue to operate but will no longer receive updates through the App Store, potentially leading to compatibility and security issues over time. New users face additional hurdles, as downloading the app now requires switching to a non-Russian Apple ID or compiling the software manually from its public GitHub repository. While sideloading remains technically feasible using Apple’s developer tools, it introduces complexity that may deter less experienced users.