Recently, we uncovered BeatBanker, an Android‑based malware campaign targeting Brazil. It spreads primarily through phishing attacks via a website disguised as the Google Play Store. To achieve their goals, the malicious APKs carry multiple components, including a cryptocurrency miner and a banking Trojan capable of completely hijacking the device and spoofing screens, among other things. In a more recent campaign, the attackers switched from the banker to a known RAT.
This blog post outlines each phase of the malware’s activity on the victim’s handset, explains how it ensures long‑term persistence, and describes its communication with mining pools.
Key findings:
- To maintain persistence, the Trojan employs a creative mechanism: it plays an almost inaudible audio file on a loop so it cannot be terminated. This inspired us to name it BeatBanker.
- It monitors battery temperature and percentage, and checks whether the user is using the device.
- At various stages of the attack, BeatBanker disguises itself as a legitimate application on the Google Play Store and as the Play Store itself.
- It deploys a banker in addition to a cryptocurrency miner.
- When the user tries to make a USDT transaction, BeatBanker creates overlay pages for Binance and Trust Wallet, covertly replacing the destination address with the threat actor’s transfer address.
- New samples now drop BTMOB RAT instead of the banking module.
Initial infection vector
The campaign begins with a counterfeit website, cupomgratisfood[.]shop, that looks exactly like the Google Play Store. This fake app store contains the “INSS Reembolso” app, which is in fact a Trojan. There are also other apps that are most likely Trojans too, but we haven’t obtained them.
The INSS Reembolso app poses as the official mobile portal of Brazil’s Instituto Nacional do Seguro Social (INSS), a government service that citizens can use to perform more than 90 social security tasks, from retirement applications and medical exam scheduling to viewing CNIS (National Registry of Social Information), tax, and payment statements, as well as tracking request statuses. By masquerading as this trusted platform, the fake page tricks users into downloading the malicious APK.
Packing
The initial APK file is packed and makes use of a native shared library (ELF) named libludwwiuh.so that is included in the application. Its main task is to decrypt another ELF file that will ultimately load the original DEX file.
First, libludwwiuh.so decrypts an embedded encrypted ELF file and drops it to a temporary location on the device under the name l.so. The same code that loaded the libludwwiuh.so library then loads this file, which uses the Java Native Interface (JNI) to continue execution.
l.so – the DEX loader
The library does not have calls to its functions; instead, it directly calls the Java methods whose names are encrypted in the stack using XOR (stack strings technique) and restored at runtime:
Initially, the loader makes a request to collect some network information using https://ipapi.is to determine whether the infected device is a mobile device, if a VPN is being used, and to obtain the IP address and other details.
This loader is engineered to bypass mobile antivirus products by utilizing dalvik.system.InMemoryDexClassLoader. It loads malicious DEX code directly into memory, avoiding the creation of any files on the device’s file system. The necessary DEX files can be extracted using dynamic analysis tools like Frida.
Furthermore, the sample incorporates anti-analysis techniques, including runtime checks for emulated or analysis environments. When such an environment is detected (or when specific checks fail, such as verification of the supported CPU_ABI), the malware can immediately terminate its own process by invoking android.os.Process.killProcess(android.os.Process.myPid()), effectively self-destructing to hinder dynamic analysis.
After execution, the malware displays a user interface that mimics the Google Play Store page, showing an update available for the INSS Reembolso app. This is intended to trick victims into granting installation permissions by tapping the “Update” button, which allows the download of additional hidden malicious payloads.
The payload delivery process mimics the application update. The malware uses the REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES permission to install APK files directly into its memory, bypassing Google Play. To ensure persistence, the malware keeps a notification about a system update pinned to the foreground and activates a foreground service with silent media playback, a tactic designed to prevent the operating system from terminating the malicious process.
Crypto mining
When UPDATE is clicked on a fake Play Store screen, the malicious application downloads and executes an ELF file containing a cryptomining payload. It starts by issuing a GET request to the C2 server at either hxxps://accessor.fud2026.com/libmine- or hxxps://fud2026.com/libmine-. The downloaded file is then decrypted using CipherInputStream(), with the decryption key being derived from the SHA-1 hash of the downloaded file’s name, ensuring that each version of the file is encrypted with a unique key. The resulting file is renamed d-miner.
The decrypted payload is an ARM-compiled XMRig 6.17.0 binary. At runtime, it attempts to create a direct TCP connection to pool.fud2026[.]com:9000. If successful, it uses this endpoint; otherwise, it automatically switches to the proxy endpoint pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com:9000. The final command-line arguments passed to XMRig are as follows:
-o pool.fud2026[.]com:9000 or pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com:9000(selected dynamically)-k(keepalive)--tls(encrypted connection)--no-color(disable colored output)--nicehash(NiceHash protocol support)
C2 telemetry
The malware uses Google’s legitimate Firebase Cloud Messaging (FCM) as its primary command‑and‑control (C2) channel. In the analyzed sample, each FCM message received triggers a check of the battery status, temperature, installation date, and user presence. A hidden cryptocurrency miner is then started or stopped as needed. These mechanisms ensure that infected devices remain permanently accessible and responsive to the attacker’s instructions, which are sent through the FCM infrastructure. The attacker monitors the following information:
- isCharging: indicates whether the phone is charging;
- batteryLevel: the exact battery percentage;
- isRecentInstallation: indicates whether the application was recently installed (if so, the implant delays malicious actions);
- isUserAway: indicates whether the user is away from the device (screen off and inactive);
- overheat: indicates whether the device is overheating;
- temp: the current battery temperature.
Persistence
The KeepAliveServiceMediaPlayback component ensures continuous operation by initiating uninterrupted playback via MediaPlayer. It keeps the service active in the foreground using a notification and loads a small, continuous audio file. This constant activity prevents the system from suspending or terminating the process due to inactivity.
The identified audio output8.mp3 is five seconds long and plays on a loop. It contains some Chinese words.
Banking module
BeatBanker compromises the machine with a cryptocurrency miner and introduces another malicious APK that acts as a banking Trojan. This Trojan uses previously obtained permission to install an additional APK called INSS Reebolso, which is associated with the package com.destination.cosmetics.
Similar to the initial malicious APK, it establishes persistence by creating and displaying a fixed notification in the foreground to hinder removal. Furthermore, BeatBanker attempts to trick the user into granting accessibility permissions to the package.
Leveraging the acquired accessibility permissions, the malware establishes comprehensive control over the device’s user interface.
The Trojan constantly monitors the foreground application. It targets the official Binance application (com.binance.dev) and the Trust Wallet application (com.wallet.crypto.trustapp), focusing on USDT transactions. When a user tries to withdraw USDT, the Trojan instantly overlays the target app’s transaction confirmation screen with a highly realistic page sourced from Base64-encoded HTML stored in the banking module.
The module captures the original withdrawal address and amount, then surreptitiously substitutes the destination address with an attacker-controlled one using AccessibilityNodeInfo.ACTION_SET_TEXT. The overlay page shows the victim the address they copied (for Binance) or just shows a loading icon (for Trust Wallet), leading them to believe they are remitting funds to the intended wallet when, in fact, the cryptocurrency is transferred to the attacker’s designated address.
Fake overlay pages: Binance (left) and Trust Wallet (right)
Target browsers
BeatBanker’s banking module monitors the following browsers installed on the victim’s device:
- Chrome
- Firefox
- sBrowser
- Brave
- Opera
- DuckDuckGo
- Dolphin Browser
- Edge
Its aim is to collect the URLs accessed by the victim using the regular expression ^(?:https?://)?(?:[^:/\\\\]+\\\\.)?([^:/\\\\]+\\\\.[^:/\\\\]+). It also offers management functionalities (add, edit, delete, list) for links saved in the device’s default browser, as well as the ability to open links provided by the attacker.
C2 communication
BeatBanker is also designed to receive commands from the C2. These commands aim to collect the victim’s personal information and gain complete control of the device.
| Command | Description |
| 0 | Starts dynamic loading of the DEX class |
| Update | Simulates software update and locks the screen |
| msg: | Displays a Toast message with the provided text |
| goauth<*> | Opens Google Authenticator (if installed) and enables the AccessService.SendGoogleAuth flag used to monitor and retrieve authentication codes |
| kill<*> | Sets the protection bypass flag AccessService.bypass to “True”and sets the initializeService.uninstall flag to “Off” |
| srec<*> | Starts or stops audio recording (microphone), storing the recorded data in a file with an automatically generated filename. The following path format is used to store the recording: /Config/sys/apps/rc/ |
| pst<*> | Pastes text from the clipboard (via Accessibility Services) |
| GRC<*> | Lists all existing audio recording files |
| gtrc<*> | Sends a specific audio recording file to the C2 |
| lcm<*> | Lists supported front camera resolutions |
| usdtress<*> | Sets a USDT cryptocurrency address when a transaction is detected |
| lnk<*> | Opens a link in the browser |
| EHP<*> | Updates login credentials (host, port, name) and restarts the application |
| ssms<*> | Sends an SMS message (individually or to all contacts) |
| CRD<*> | Adds (E>) or removes (D>) packages from the list of blocked/disabled applications |
| SFD<*> | Deletes files (logs, recordings, tones) or uninstalls itself |
| adm<>lck<> | Immediately locks the screen using Device Administrator permissions |
| adm<>wip<> | Performs a complete device data wipe (factory reset) |
| Aclk<*> | Executes a sequence of automatic taps (auto-clicker) or lists existing macros |
| KBO<*>lod | Checks the status of the keylogger and virtual keyboard |
| KBO<*>AKP/AKA | Requests permission to activate a custom virtual keyboard or activates one |
| KBO<*>ENB: | Enables (1) or disables (0) the keylogger |
| RPM<*>lod | Checks the status of all critical permissions |
| RPM<*>ACC | Requests Accessibility Services permission |
| RPM<*>DOZ | Requests Doze/App Standby permission (battery optimization) |
| RPM<*>DRW | Requests Draw Over Other Apps permission (overlay) |
| RPM<*>INST | Requests permission to install apps from unknown sources (Android 8+) |
| ussd<*> | Executes a USSD code (e.g., *#06# for IMEI) |
| Blkt<*> | Sets the text for the lock overlay |
| BLKV<*> | Enables or disables full-screen lock using WindowManager.LayoutParams.TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY to display a black FrameLayout element over the entire screen |
| SCRD<> / SCRD2<> | Enables/disables real-time screen text submission to the C2 (screen reading) |
| rdall<*> | Clears or sends all keylogger logs |
| rdd<*> | Deletes a specific log file |
| rd<*> | Sends the content of a specific keylogger file |
| MO<*> | Manages application monitoring (add, remove, list, screenshot, etc.) |
| FW<*> | Controls VPN and firewall (status, block/allow apps, enable/disable) |
| noti<*> | Creates persistent and custom notifications |
| sp<*> | Executes a sequence of swipes/taps (gesture macro) |
| lodp<*> | Manages saved links in the internal browser (add, edit, delete, list) |
| scc: | Starts screen capture/streaming |
New BeatBanker samples dropping BTMOB
Our recent detection efforts uncovered a campaign leveraging a fraudulent StarLink application that we assess as being a new BeatBanker variant. The infection chain mirrored previous instances, employing identical persistence methods – specifically, looped audio and fixed notifications. Furthermore, this variant included a crypto miner similar to those seen previously. However, rather than deploying the banking module, it was observed distributing the BTMOB remote administration tool.
The BTMOB APK is highly obfuscated and contains a class responsible for configuration. Despite this, it’s possible to identify a parser used to define the application’s behavior on the device, as well as persistence features, such as protection against restart, deletion, lock reset, and the ability to perform real-time screen recording.
String decryption
The simple decryption routine uses repetitive XOR between the encrypted data and a short key. It iterates through the encrypted text byte by byte, repeating the key from the beginning whenever it reaches the end. At each position, the sample XORs the encrypted byte with the corresponding byte of the key, overwriting the original. Ultimately, the modified byte array contains the original text, which is then converted to UTF-8 and returned as a string.
Malware-as-a-Service
BTMOB is an Android remote administration tool that evolved from the CraxsRAT, CypherRAT, and SpySolr families. It provides full remote control of the victim’s device and is sold in a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model. On July 26, 2025, a threat actor posted a screenshot of the BTMOB RAT in action on GitHub under the username “brmobrats”, along with a link to the website btmob[.]xyz. The website contains information about the BTMOB RAT, including its version history, features, and other relevant details. It also redirects to a Telegram contact. Cyfirma has already linked this account to CraxsRAT and CypherRAT.
Recently, a YouTube channel was created by a different threat actor that features videos demonstrating how to use the malware and facilitate its sale via Telegram.
We also saw the distribution and sale of leaked BTMOB source code on some dark web forums. This may suggest that the creator of BeatBanker acquired BTMOB from its original author or the source of the leak and is utilizing it as the final payload, replacing the banking module observed in the INSS Reebolso incident.
In terms of functionality, BTMOB maintains a set of intrusive capabilities, including: automatic granting of permissions, especially on Android 13–15 devices; use of a black FrameLayout overlay to hide system notifications similar to the one observed in the banking module; silent installation; persistent background execution; and mechanisms designed to capture screen lock credentials, including PINs, patterns, and passwords. The malware also provides access to front and rear cameras, captures keystrokes in real time, monitors GPS location, and constantly collects sensitive data. Together, these functionalities provide the operator with comprehensive remote control, persistent access, and extensive surveillance capabilities over compromised devices.
Victims
All variants of BeatBanker – those with the banking module and those with the BTMOB RAT – were detected on victims in Brazil. Some of the samples that deliver BTMOB appear to use WhatsApp to spread, as well as phishing pages.
Conclusion
BeatBanker is an excellent example of how mobile threats are becoming more sophisticated and multi-layered. Initially focused in Brazil, this Trojan operates a dual campaign, acting as a Monero cryptocurrency miner, discreetly draining your device’s battery life while also stealing banking credentials and tampering with cryptocurrency transactions. Moreover, the most recent version goes even further, substituting the banking module with a full-fledged BTMOB RAT.
The attackers have devised inventive tricks to maintain persistence. They keep the process alive by looping an almost inaudible audio track, which prevents the operating system from terminating it and allows BeatBanker to remain active for extended periods.
Furthermore, the threat demonstrates an obsession with staying hidden. It monitors device usage, battery level and temperature. It even uses Google’s legitimate system (FCM) to receive commands. The threat’s banking module is capable of overlaying Binance and Trust Wallet screens and diverting USDT funds to the criminals’ wallets before the victim even notices.
The lesson here is clear: distrust is your best defense. BeatBanker spreads through fake websites that mimic Google Play, disguising itself as trustworthy government applications. To protect yourself against threats like this, it is essential to:
- Download apps only from official sources. Always use the Google Play Store or the device vendor’s official app store. Make sure you use the correct app store app, and verify the developer.
- Check permissions. Pay attention to the permissions that applications request, especially those related to accessibility and installation of third-party packages.
- Keep the system updated. Security updates for Android and your mobile antivirus are essential.
Our solutions detect this threat as HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.BeatBanker and HEUR:Trojan-Dropper.AndroidOS.Banker.*
Indicators of compromise
Additional IoCs, TTPs and detection rules are available to customers of our Threat Intelligence Reporting service. For more details, contact us at crimewareintel@kaspersky.com.
Host-based (MD5 hashes)
F6C979198809E13859196B135D21E79B – INSS Reebolso
D3005BF1D52B40B0B72B3C3B1773336B – StarLink
Domains
cupomgratisfood[.]shop
fud2026[.]com
accessor.fud2026[.]com
pool.fud2026[.]com
pool-proxy.fud2026[.]com
aptabase.fud2026[.]com
aptabase.khwdji319[.]xyz
btmob[.]xyz
bt-mob[.]net
